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From the trenches
This section is intended for occasional contributions from on-the-ground prac-
titioners in Geneva and national capitals. Our hope is that this category will inspire
other practitioners to submit notes and articles – typically in the range of 2,000
to 10,000 words – to the World Trade Review. As with all notes and articles
submitted to the World Trade Review, manuscripts in this category will be
reviewed by independent referees. However, the focus is intended to be practice
oriented and at least one of the two referees will be a fellow practitioner.
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1. Introduction
The WTO Doha Round negotiations were launched in November 2001, in Doha,
Qatar in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack on the US. The event was a sig-
niﬁcant success for the newly formed WTO after the dramatic failure of the
Seattle Ministerial Conference held in December 1999 to launch the new round.
However, this initial success was to be marred by several subsequent failed
ministerial1 meetings and missed deadlines. The Doha mandate called for
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The author is indebted to Amrita Narlikar and Rorden Wilkinson for the challenging comments and
suggestions made on earlier versions of the paper that inspired the ﬁnal draft. The original research for this
paper was undertaken for a forthcoming book edited by Amrita Narlikar and Brendan Vickers.
1 The WTO has formal Ministerial Conferences that are required to take place at least once in two
years. Since its formation at the Marrakech Ministerial Meeting, the WTO has held ﬁve Ministerial
Conferences, with the last being the 6th Ministerial Conference held in Hong Kong, in December 2005.
However, there are other informal ministerial gatherings of the WTO that have taken diﬀerent forms,
including so-called mini-ministerial meetings that were held to discuss the launch of the Doha Round,
small groups of ministers meeting among themselves (G4, G5, and G6), and larger groups of ministers
(approximately 30) convened by the DG to negotiate breakthroughs in the negotiations, sometimes re-
ferred to as the ‘Green Room’. These smaller informal ministerial meetings have no legal status and any
‘breakthroughs’ arrived at in these must be taken to the broader membership for decision.
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modalities2 in agriculture to be agreed by March 2002, and in NAMA (non-
agricultural market access or industrial tariﬀs) by the end of May 2002. By
December 2008, the establishment of full modalities, in the agriculture and the
NAMA negotiations, was still to be achieved by the WTO.
The attempt by WTO members to secure a ‘framework agreement’ by the
time of the Cancun Ministerial Conference, in September 2003, was frustrated by
the collapse of the Cancun meeting. The limited objective of WTO members to at
least agree on a ‘framework’ for modalities was ﬁnally achieved in the July 2004
Framework Agreement. Building on this success and learning from the Cancun
collapse, the WTO reduced its expectation to achieve full modalities at the next
WTO Ministerial Conference held in Hong Kong, China, and merely made some
incremental advances on the July 2004 Framework Agreement. However, since
then the various attempts to achieve full modalities in agriculture and NAMA have
been unsuccessful. A group of six (G6) WTO members (US, EU, Japan, Australia,
Brazil, and India) attempted to advance the modalities negotiations among them-
selves in early 2006, only to result in another failure for the WTO by July 2006.
Pascal Lamy, the Director-General of the WTO, who hosted and chaired the
G6 ministerial meetings in July 2006, in Geneva, decided to suspend the Doha
negotiations.
A smaller group of four members (EU, US, India, and Brazil – G4) then began
a process of negotiation amongst themselves in an attempt to make a breakthrough
on the vexed issues of agriculture and NAMA modalities during the ﬁrst half of
2007. The G4 Ministerial meeting held in Potsdam, Germany, from the 19–23
June 2007 collapsed on the third day of the scheduled four to ﬁve day meeting.
After the collapse of the Potsdam G4 Ministerial meeting, the WTO Director-
General, Pascal Lamy, called on the chairs of the WTO negotiating groups to
resume the multilateral negotiating process of the Doha Round.3
The chairs of agriculture and NAMA had produced several draft texts since
June 2007, leading to their third draft texts produced on the 10 July 2008.
These texts were to become the basis for the ﬁnalization of the negotiations on
agriculture and NAMA modalities at the end of July 2008. After several missed
informal deadlines, the chair of the WTO Trade Negotiating Council (TNC),
Pascal Lamy, called for a ﬁnal negotiating process, based on the chairs texts, to be
held from the 21 July, with about 30–40 Ministers invited to participate in the
process. However, this attempt to conclude the negotiations on agriculture and
NAMA was to fail again with the collapse of the G7 (EU, US, Japan, Australia,
2 ‘Modalities ’ are not clearly deﬁned in theWTO. The concept refers to the technical formulas that are
utilized to develop a schedule of commitments (on tariﬀ reductions or subsidy reductions) that members
have to ﬁnally agree to. A ‘Framework Agreement’ falls short of this objective and develops the archi-
tecture for the modalities agreement without fully agreeing the technical formulas that will be used to
determine the legal commitments of members.
3 See WTO doc, ‘Informal TNC Meeting at the Level of Head of Delegation’, Job (07)/105, 22 June
2007.
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China, India, and Brazil) ministerial, and the consequent failure of the WTO to
conclude the negotiations on the modalities of agriculture and NAMA at the end
of July 2008. The G7 ministers and several other small groups that met in July
produced some incremental, but very controversial advances, on the agriculture
and NAMA modalities negotiations.
Section 2 of the paper will brieﬂy discuss the ‘Lamy Package’ that emerged out
of the G7 ministerial meetings and the subsequent reports of the chairs of agri-
culture and NAMA on the July 2008 modalities negotiations. The paper will then
update the reader on the developments in the WTO negotiations post-July 2008 up
to the end of December 2008. Attempts by Pascal Lamy to invite ministers to
Geneva to continue the negotiations that collapsed in July were to fail. There were
intense bilalteral and trilateral negotiations between the US, India, and China that
were facilitated by Pascal Lamy in several teleconferences. However, as Pascal
Lamy intensiﬁed his eﬀorts, US Congressional Leaders sent letters to President
Bush urging him not to support a ministerial negotiation in Geneva at the end
of December. The USTR (United States Trade Representative), Susan Schwab, was
to increase the pressure on China, India, and Brazil to participate in sectoral
negotiations (i.e., on speciﬁc sectors such as chemicals, industrial machinery,
health care products, etc.) in the industrial sector and negotiate further market
opening for US exporters. At the same time, several developed countries, including
Japan and Canada, were seeking greater exemptions from the July agriculture texts
for their sensitive agricultural sectors.
These events illustrate the way in which imbalanced texts can persist in WTO
negotiations and the pressures exerted by the US (and other advanced countries)
to maintain a high level of ambition in areas of interest to the developed countries,
whilst reducing the ambition in areas of interest to developing countries. Pascal
Lamy had no option but to cancel his proposed ministerial meetings scheduled
for the end of December 2008, thus creating another failure for the WTO.
Section 3 of this paper will discuss the reasons for the failure of the July 2008
ministerial meetings. It suggests three reasons for the failure of the ministerial
meetings at the end of July. The ﬁrst reason oﬀered for the failure is the persistence
of protectionism within the EU and the US, and their attempts to raise the bar of
the level of ambition for developing countries, particularly the major emerging
markets that have been perceived as signiﬁcant competitors with the EU and US.
Several writers have argued that the history of the GATT reﬂects : the margin-
alization of developing country interests, the assertion of the major economic
powers of their own market access interests in foreign markets, and the persistence
of protectionism in the major developed country markets.4 This has resulted in
an ‘asymmetry of economic opportunity’ against developing countries and the
4 R. Wilkinson, The WTO: Crisis and Governance of Global Trade (Routledge, 2006). See also
M. Finger, ‘ Implementation and the imbalance: dealing with hangover from the Uruguay Round’,Oxford
Review of Economic Policy, 23(3) (2007): 440–460.
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persistence of unbalanced texts in favour of developed countries in the GATT up
to the Uruguay Round.5 This paper evaluates the validity of this view during the
Doha Round and during the period leading up to and including the July 2008
ministerial meetings. It argues that there has been a continuity in the tendency
toward protectionism in the EU and the US since the onset of the Doha Round. In
addition, the EU and US have increased the collaboration between them, accom-
modating each others interests and pursuing an aggressive market opening agenda
vis-a`-vis the major emerging markets that have been perceived to be their compe-
titors in global markets. This paper thus contributes to the thesis advanced by
several writers of the persistence of ‘asymmetry of economic opportunity’ in
favour of developed countries in the WTO.
The second reason that is oﬀered for the failure is the resurrection of the ‘prin-
cipal supplier ’ approach and power politics of the earlier GATT period (in the
form of the G7), that resulted in the collapse of each phase of the process in the
past, when it was employed at Potsdam in June 2007 (G4), in July 2006 when
the failure of the G6 ministers led to the suspension of the round by the DG, and
at the collapse of the Cancun ministerial meeting where the majority of members
were not represented in the Green Room.6 The moving deadlines for the date of the
ministerial meetings from before Easter to after Easter, to the third week of May,
to mid-June, and then end July 2008 created a great deal of uncertainty. In con-
trast, the July 2004 Framework Agreement was negotiated in a more inclusive
multilateral process, resulting in a successful outcome. Similarly, the Green
Rooms, chaired by Pascal Lamy, at the Hong Kong ministerial meeting at the end
of 2005, were able to make some incremental advances on the July 2004
Framework Agreement, due to the inclusiveness of the meetings.
This paper will relate the current debate in the WTO on the inclusiveness of the
decision-making process during the July 2008 ministerial meetings to the earliest
debates in the International Trade Organization (ITO) and GATT. During the
latter debate on decision making in the ITO, developing countries had voiced
strong opposition to weighted voting that was favoured by the US and came out in
favour of the more inclusive consensus method of decision making. However, the
principal supplier method of tariﬀ negotiations by which a country could only be
requested to make tariﬀ cuts on a particular product by the principal supplier of
that product to that country, which the US insisted upon, locked out developing
countries from most of the GATT negotiations.7 This paper will thus review the
debate in the recent Warwick Commission and the earlier Sutherland Report
on the decision-making procedures and the inclusiveness of WTO negotiations.
5 See R. Wilkinson, ‘The WTO in Hong Kong: What it Really Means for the Doha Development
Agenda’, New Political Economy, 11(2) (June 2006).
6 For a discussion of the CancunMinisterial Meetings, see F. Ismail, ‘Agricultural Trade Liberalisation
and the Poor: A Development Perspective on Cancun’, BRIDGES (January 2004): 4–5.
7 R. Wilkinson and J. Scott, ‘Developing Country Participation in the GATT: A Re-assessment’,
World Trade Review, 3 (July 2008): 1–18.
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It will be argued that the formation of the G7 group of members by the Chairman
of theWTO Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) during the July 2008 ministerial
meetings was a return to the principal supplier principle favoured by the US in
the earliest days of the GATT.
The paper will argue that the principal supplier method is an obsolete (or
‘medieval’) method of decision making, and was a contributory factor to the
failure of the WTO ministerial meetings in July 2008. The G7 ministerial meetings
called by the Chairman of the TNC, Pascal Lamy, during the July 2008 ministerial
meetings failed to achieve the objective of negotiating the breakthrough in the
agriculture and NAMA modalities negotiations that WTO members had hoped
for. Some agreements reached in the G7 on elements of the modalities – the so-
called ‘Lamy Package’ – did not have the support of all the members of the G7,8
and the G7 did not enjoy the support of the majority of WTO members that
felt that their issues were marginalized in the negotiations (discussed below). The
paper thus calls for a more inclusive method of decision making that recognizes
the role of the many developing country coalitions that have been created during
the Doha Round.
The third reason ascribes the failure to the imbalanced nature of the texts, both
within NAMA and between NAMA and agriculture. The promise of the Doha
Round was that the trade distorting subsidies and prohibitive tariﬀ barriers in
developed countries, that undermined developing country agriculture, would be
substantially reduced. In NAMA, the industrial tariﬀs of developed countries still
retained high peaks and tariﬀ escalation but were relatively low, whilst developing
countries had relatively high bound tariﬀs. Developed countries were thus
expected to make a major contribution by reducing their agriculture subsidies and
opening their agriculture markets and developing countries were expected to
reciprocate in a proportionate manner by reducing their relatively higher bound
tariﬀs in NAMA. However, with each revised set of texts produced by the chairs,
the agriculture text was perceived to contain only insigniﬁcant commitments
by the developed countries in agriculture, whilst the NAMA text provided for
relatively onerous market opening into developing countries, particularly the
larger emerging economies.
This was partly ascribed to the role of the chair of the NAMA negotiating group,
who, by his own admission, attempted at the very outset, in his ﬁrst draft text,
to determine the level of ambition himself.9 The criticism made by the NAMA 11
8WTO doc, letters by Kamal Nath, Minister of Commerce of India, to the WTO Director-General,
Pascal Lamy, dated 24 September 2008 and 17 October 2008, Oﬃce of the WTO Director-General.
9 See WTO doc, ‘Chairman’s Introduction to the Draft NAMA Modalities’, Negotiating Group on
Market Access, Job (07)/126, 17 July 2007. There are several instances where the Chair reveals his own
preference. On page one he states, ‘If I have been invited to propose the modalities it is because Members
have been unable to bridge their positions themselves’_ ‘ it is almost certain you will be disappointed
with my proposed modalities since, by deﬁnition they cannot fully reﬂect any Member’s position but
rather a compromise between their positions’. On page 2, after recognizing the diﬀerent views on the
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group of developing countries10 was that these views, reﬂected in the ﬁrst draft
NAMA text, coincided rather closely with those of the major developed countries,
and failed to represent their views. In sharp contrast, the agriculture chair con-
sistently maintained a bottom-up process that included the views of all the diﬀer-
ent groups in his diﬀerent draft texts. Two recent academic papers attempt
to theorize the role of the chair in WTO negotiations. Jonas Tallberg11 provides a
‘rational institutionalist theory’ of the role of the chair in international nego-
tiations. He argues that the chairs that play these roles are vested with ‘asymmetric ’
power to inﬂuence the negotiations. After applying this theory to the role of the
chairs in the WTO, he argues that there was ‘no evidence of the chairs having
systematically biased outcomes’. However, this thesis is contradicted by the work
of John Odell,12 who has undertaken an extensive study of the role of the chairs in
WTO negotiations and provides several examples of sub-optimal or ineﬃcient
outcomes as a result of injudicious use of the brokerage methods or the bias of the
chair. This paper will argue that, whilst the basic theory advanced by Tallberg is
a useful framework for our analysis, his ﬁnding that there was ‘no evidence of
the chairs having systematically biased outcomes’ is incorrect. In addition to the
evidence provided by Odell, the analysis below13 of the role of the chairs in the July
2008 ministerial meetings provides further evidence of sub-optimal or ineﬃcient
outcomes as a result of injudicious use of the brokerage methods or the bias of
the chair. This paper will argue that this ineﬃcient role of the chairs in the July
2008 ministerial meetings was to become a signiﬁcant contributory factor for the
collapse of the July 2008 ministerial meetings.
Section 3 will thus undertake an assessment of the collapse of the end July
ministerial meetings and advance three main reasons for the collapse (discussed
above) with reference to the theoretical and conceptual debates in the academic
literature.
Section 4 concludes the discussion on the analysis of the collapse of the July
ministerial meetings and makes some recommendations for WTO members to
deﬁnition of ‘ less than full reciprocity’, he states, ‘I am conﬁdent that my proposed modalities satisfy the
requirement for less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments. ’ He goes on to recognize that there is
a strong link between the level of ambition in agriculture with NAMA but nevertheless states, ‘ I have
proposed a range of ambitions in market access in NAMA that I believe could be consistent with the
outcome of the agriculture negotiations which remain a moving target’, and then admits, ‘Of course, some
members will disagree and will judge the oﬀer on the agriculture side insuﬃcient. ’ Thus the chair decided
to set the level of ambition of the negotiations himself.
10 The NAMA 11 was constituted in the period before the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in
December 2005 and included the following members: Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Tunisia, Namibia, South Africa, and Venezuela. Although the group is called the NAMA 11,
there are only ten members of the group.
11 J. Tallberg, ‘The Power of the Chair: Formal Leadership in International Cooperation’,
International Studies Quarterly (forthcoming).
12 J. Odell, ‘Chairing a WTO Negotiation’, Journal of International Economic Law, 8(2): 425–448.
13 See also F. Ismail, ‘The Role of the Chair in the WTONegotiations: From the Potsdam Collapse in
June 2007 to July 2008’, Journal of World Trade, 43(5) (2009, forthcoming).
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address the underlying causes of the collapse. The paper concludes by calling on
developing countries to continue to work, in 2009, for a successful conclusion of
the Doha Round based on its development mandate.
2. The WTO July Ministerial Meetings and the ‘Lamy Package’
This section will begin by describing the events that led to the collapse of the G7
Ministerial Meetings at the end of July 2008. It will then set out the main elements
of the ‘Lamy Package’. The subsequent reports of the chairs of agriculture and
NAMA are then brieﬂy summarized.
What happened during the 11 days of the July 2008 (19–29) modalities
negotiations?
After two days of opening statements, in the WTO TNC and Green Room, Pascal
Lamy constituted the G7 Ministerial (USA, EU, Japan, Australia, China, India,
and Brazil), which was to dominate the negotiations until their collapse on 29 July.
The negotiations were held in diﬀerent formats. They began with the TNC, then
Green Rooms (about 31 members), and then the creation of the G7 onWednesday,
23 July. The TNC and the Green Rooms were held every day. However, on
Monday, 28 July, members waited all day and night for a Green Room meeting
which did not materialize. The G7 had been meeting throughout the night. And
when the G7 convened again the next day (Tuesday, 29 July), it ﬁnally collapsed
over their inability to agree on the Special Safeguard Mechanism.14
The last TNC meeting after the collapse of the Ministerial meetings was held on
Wednesday, 30 July. Pascal Lamy reported on the failure of the negotiations to
reach full modalities.15 He argued that the G7 were not able to ﬁnd convergence on
the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) and thus were not able to get to the next
set of issues which would have begun with the Cotton issue. He stated that the
failure was a collective responsibility and that the progress made in all groups
needed to be preserved. In this regard, he stated that the chairs of the negotiating
groups would be submitting their reports.
The Lamy Package
The ‘Lamy Package’16 that was submitted to the ‘Green Room’ on Friday night
(25 July) proposed compromise in several elements of the agriculture and NAMA
modalities texts.
On the overall trade distorting support (OTDS) for the US, it was proposed
by Brazil, India, and China that the US should go to the bottom of the range
14 The SSM is a mechanism that was agreed in Hong Kong for poor farmers in developing countries to
protect their domestic markets from import surges (particularly from highly subsidized US and other
developed country exports).
15Washington Trade Daily, 31 July 2008.
16 SeeWashington Trade Daily, 28 July 2008.
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($13 billion dollars). The US oﬀered $15 billion dollars and then later $14.5 billion
(about the middle of the range). In exchange the US called for a ‘peace clause’
(assurances that their programmes should not be subject to legal challenges) and
signiﬁcant market access in agriculture, NAMA, and Services.17 Brazil accepted the
US oﬀer on OTDS.
On NAMA, the ‘Lamy Package’ proposed coeﬃcients in the middle of the
NAMA chair ranges.18 The package proposed a coeﬃcient of 8 for developed
countries.19 For developing countries it proposed a coeﬃcient of 20 for the ﬁrst
group of developing countries that opt for a lower coeﬃcient and higher
ﬂexibilities ;20 22 for the second group that take the normal ﬂexibilities ; and a
coeﬃcient of 25 for the third group that opt to take no ﬂexibilities. Brazil nego-
tiated hard in the G7 for the ﬂexibilities21 that were provided to the ﬁrst group to
be extended from 14% of lines and volume to an extra 2% of trade volume. This
was included in the Lamy Package.
On anti-concentration,22 the EU and US (together with Japan and Australia)
insisted on 30% of lines per chapter to be exempted from ﬂexibilities, whilst
Brazil, India, and China were only prepared to accept a 10% exclusion.23 The
Lamy text proposed that 20% of lines, or 9% of value per chapter, be excluded.
On sectorals, the Lamy Package changed the language on sectorals, from the
10 July NAMA Draft Text, that called for sectorals to help ‘balance the overall
results of the negotiations on NAMA’ to providing a carrot of ‘ increased coef-
ﬁcients for those that participate in sectorals and calls for these countries to com-
mit to participate in at least two sectoral initiatives’. This proposal was opposed
by both India and China and thus re-negotiated.24 The new language restates
the non-mandatory nature of sectorals and that participation in the negotiations
of the terms of at least two sectorals of their choosing shall not prejudice the
17 See A. Kaushik, R. Kaukab, and P. Kumar, A Brief Analysis of the July 2008 Lamy Package, CUTS
International.
18 The Lamy Package adopted the proposed middle ground of the NAMA chairs 10 July 2008 Draft
Text.
19 The depth of tariﬀ reductions was to be determined with the use of the so-called ‘Swiss formula’:
Z=AX/(A+X); where
X=initial tariﬀ rate
A=coeﬃcient and maximum tariﬀ rate
Z=resulting lower tariﬀ rate (end of period)
A lower coeﬃcient implies deeper cuts. A co-eﬃcient of 8 brought down all tariﬀs to below 8%.
20 The swiss formula of 20 applied to developing country tariﬀs would bring all tariﬀs below 20.
21 The tariﬀ reduction method agreed to allow developing countries a percentage of tariﬀs less than
formula cuts (about 50% of the formula). For those developing countries that chose a coeﬃcient of 22,
10% of tariﬀ lines could be granted these ﬂexibilities. Brazil chose a deeper coeﬃcient of 20 so that it
could obtain more ﬂexibilities (than 10%) to cover its tariﬀ lines and trade volume.
22 This was an EU and US proposal to prevent all the tariﬀ lines in a particular sector from being
excluded from tariﬀ cuts.
23 SeeWashington Trade Daily, 4 August 2008.
24 See WTO doc, ‘Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Don Stephenson to the Trade Negotiations
Committee’, Negotiating Group on Market Access, Job (08)/96, 12 August 2008.
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decision of the member to participate in such a sectoral. The resistance of India
and China to make sectorals mandatory did succeed in preventing the attempts
by the US and the EU to create a mandatory linkage between the participation
of developing countries in sectorals and the core NAMA modality (formula and
ﬂexibilities).
The agriculture and NAMA chairs report on the collapse
The chairs of the agriculture and NAMA negotiations submitted their reports of
the July 2008 modalities negotiations on the 12 August. The chair of agriculture in
his report25 states that whilst there was a credible basis for conclusion of many
issues, there was disagreement on other very signiﬁcant issues. He goes on to state
that he is not in a position to record the convergences in precise textual language
as the circumstances have changed. Therefore, he states that the existing texts
remain. Throughout his report he refers to the reports of the G7 and Green Room
discussions and package that were reported on without attempting to convert any
of this into textual language.
The Chair of NAMA in contrast states that convergence was reached on the
NAMA modalities by the G7 and states that ‘ the majority of members meeting in
Green Room format indicated that, while they had reservations over particular
issues, they could live with the proposed compromise outcomes on these elements
of the NAMAmodalities’.26 He then cites three members (South Africa, Argentina,
and Venezuela) that did not provide explicit support. He goes on to include
the numbers in the ‘Lamy Package’ on all the issues including the coeﬃcients,
ﬂexibilities, anti-concentration, and sectorals in textual form. On the sectorals, the
new negotiated language after the ﬁrst Lamy text was negotiated with India and
China is included.
After the collapse of the July 2008 ministerial meetings, Pascal Lamy was to
relentlessly pursue the objective of concluding the modalities negotiations.
However, his eﬀorts failed to persuade some of the major players to narrow their
diﬀerences on the remaining issues and return to Geneva to conclude the nego-
tiations on agriculture and NAMA modalities. We brieﬂy discuss these eﬀorts
below to provide an update for the reader.
Another failure in December 2008
The G20 Leaders meeting in Washington on the 15 November 2008 instructed
their Trade Ministers to conclude modalities by the end of the year.27 Pascal Lamy
25 WTO doc, ‘Report to the Trade Negotiations Committee by the Chairman of the Special Session of
the Committee on Agriculture, Ambassador Crawford Falconer’, Committee on Agriculture Special
Session, Job (08)/95, 12 August 2008.
26 WTO doc, ‘Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Don Stephenson to the Trade Negotiations
Committee’, Negotiating Group on Market Access, Job (08)/96, 12 August 2008.
27 See ‘The G20 Summit Declaration’, 16 November 2008, www.soﬁaecho.com/article/the-
g20-summit.
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sent a fax28 to all delegations on the 1 December, urging them to keep trying
to conclude the modalities negotiations by the end of the year. He called for
members ‘to have ministers in town in a window of time somewhere around the
13–15 December 2008’. Later Pascal Lamy postponed the proposed Ministerial
meeting to the 17–19 December.29
The chairs of agriculture and NAMA released draft modalities texts on the
6 December 2008.30 The chairman of the agriculture Negotiations also submitted
three working documents31 on issues where signiﬁcant diﬀerences remained
between members – namely, the SSM, designation of Sensitive Products, and
the Creation of new TRQs. Pascal Lamy explained that signiﬁcant diﬀerences
still remained on the key issues of Sectorals, the SSM, and Cotton, and including
some country-speciﬁc issues in NAMA, on Argentina, South Africa, and
Venezuela.
Pascal Lamy then began a series of video conferences with Ministers from the
US (Susan Schwab), India (Kamal Nath), and China (Chen Deming). In a series
of teleconferences held between the US and China, and US and India, on the
issues of sectorals, the SSM, and cotton, the USTR, Susan Schwab, demanded
that China participate in at least two sectors of interest to the US, of which at
least one had to be chemicals. Susan Schwab required the participants in these
sectoral negotiations not to leave the negotiations until zero for zero modalities
were agreed.32 She also demanded a safe harbour or ‘peace clause’ (a commit-
ment not to raise subsidy disputes against the US on product speciﬁc commit-
ments during the implementation period) for the US in agriculture. A new
demand by the US for a price cross-check mechanism for the SSM was also
rejected by India. The US was also reported to have had no new proposals to
make on reducing its trade distorting cotton subsidies. However, by Friday,
13 December, all eﬀorts to make movement in these bilateral and trilateral video
conferences had failed to narrow the gaps that remained between the major
players and the Director-General, Pascal Lamy, cancelled the proposed minis-
terial meeting.33
28 WTO doc, ‘Information to Delegations’, Fax from Pascal Lamy to all Heads of Delegations,
1 December 2008.
29Washington Trade Daily, 9 December 2008.
30 WTO doc, ‘Fourth Revision of Draft Modalities for Non-Agricultural Market Access’, Negotiating
Group on Market Access, TN/MA/ W/103/Rev.3, 6 December 2008. See also ‘Revised Draft Modalities
for Agriculture’, Committee on Agriculture Special Session, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4, 6 December 2008.
31 See WTO doc, ‘Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture – Sensitive Products: Designation’,
Committee on Agriculture Special Session, TN/AG/W/5, 6 December 2008. ‘Revised Draft Modalities for
Agriculture. Sensitive Products: Tariﬀ Quota Creation’, Committee on Agriculture Special Session, TN/
AG/W/6, 6 December 2008. ‘Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture: Special Safeguard Mechanism’,
Committee on Agriculture Special Session, TN/AG/W/7, 6 December 2008.
32 SeeWashington Trade Daily, 12 December 2008.
33 SeeWashington Trade Daily, 15 December 2008.
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3. Assessment of the collapse of the July 2008 Geneva Ministerial Meetings
What was the cause of the collapse?
The Lamy text (produced on Friday night, 25 July) proposed a 140% trigger on
the SSM for developing countries – allowing developing countries to exceed their
current bound rates only if imports on a product increased by 40% or more, in
which case developing countries could exceed their bound rates by 15%.34 India
rejected this proposal and insisted on a 115% trigger instead.
Another compromise text tabled on Tuesday morning (29 July) proposed
a 115–120% trigger for India with 33% increase in bound tariﬀs and another
trigger of between 130% and 140% and a 50% increase in tariﬀs. India was
prepared to accept the 120% trigger. China could not accept the compromise.
The US refused to move from the 140% trigger. Pascal Lamy could take the
process no further and the meeting collapsed. The US stated that ‘any safeguard
must distinguish between the legitimate need to address exceptional situations
involving sudden and extreme import surges and a mechanism that can be
abused’.35
The proximate cause of the collapse was the SSM but the negotiations could
have broken on several other issues, including cotton, NAMA, new tariﬀ quota
creation, tariﬀ simpliﬁcation, bananas, geographic indicators (GIs), the relation-
ship between the Trade Related Intellectual Rights Agreement (TRIPS) and
the Conference on Bio-diversity (CBD), ﬁshery subsidies, rules (anti-dumping),
preference erosion, tropical products or duty free quota free market access
(DFQFMA) for the least developed countries (LDCs)!
We oﬀer three main reasons for the failure of the July Ministerial meeting: the
increasing protectionism within the EU and the US, and their attempts to raise
the bar of the level of ambition for developing countries, the resurrection of the
‘principal supplier ’ approach and power politics of the earlier GATT period, and
the imbalanced nature of the texts and the role of the chair. In the discussion
below, we discuss the theoretical issues and concepts that have emerged in the
academic literature to describe each of these concerns and then discuss them in
the context of the failed July ministerial meetings.
The discussion below turns to the ﬁrst reason advanced by the paper for the
collapse of the July 2008 ministerial meetings: that of increasing protectionism
in the US and EU and assertion of their narrow mercantilist interests. The
34 A report by the Washington Trade Daily (WTD 07/08/208) states that India and China wanted a
trigger of 110, whilst the US demanded 155 and Australia 165. The report states that Lamy’s ﬁrst proposal
put forward on Thursday night proposed a ﬁgure of 120% of imports, but on Friday morning the Lamy
Package changed this ﬁgure to 140%. This prompted Kamal Nath to state that he would not be party to
the Package and he threatened to walk out of the talks. However, the DG left the ﬁgure of 140 in the text,
which was then presented to the Green Room for consideration on Friday night.
35Washington Trade Daily, 30 July 2008 and WTO Reporter, ‘Negotiations, Doha Talks Collapse
Over US–India Dispute on Ag Safeguards: Future of Round in Doubt’, 30 July 2008.
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discussion below will begin with a historical overview of this trend and proceed to
evaluate the July 2008 ministerial meetings in this context.
(1) Increasing protectionism and aggressive demands of US and EU
A historical perspective of EU/US protectionism in the GATT/WTO and
asymmetrical outcomes
The history of the GATT suggests that the interests of developing countries were
largely ignored leading to imbalanced texts that reﬂected the interests of the
dominant economic powers. The original GATT 1947 was based on the principle
of MFN (most favoured nation treatment, i.e. that all members shall be treated
equally), and thus made no special provisions for the diﬀerent levels of economic
development of developing countries.
Developing countries however had raised these concerns during the negotiations
on the ITO Charter that was later rejected by the US Congress.36 Developing
countries continued to urge developed countries to address their particular devel-
opment concerns in the GATT. This was to lead to a study of these issues that
produced the Haberler Report in October 1958. The Haberler Report found that
there was some substance in the feeling of disquiet among primary producing
countries that the present rules and conventions about commercial policies are
relatively unfavourable to them.
Wilkinson37 observes that by the mid-1960s the evolution of the GATT led
to two diﬀerent experiences. For the industrialized countries, ‘ liberalization
under the GATT had seen the volume and value of trade in manufactured, semi-
manufactured and industrial goods increase signiﬁcantly ’. In addition, ‘they had
also managed to protect their agricultural and textile and clothing sectors through
a blend of formal and informal restrictions’. To give eﬀect to this, there were a
number of GATT waivers to protect developed country agricultural markets and
the exclusion of textiles and clothing from liberalization in developed countries.
For developing countries this meant that the products of interest to them were
excluded from liberalization.38
US perceptions of the increasing competitiveness of the European Union, Japan,
and East Asia and their economic ‘convergence’ with the US, were to lead to
increasing US protectionism in the 1970s and the 1980s. Syvia Ostry39 calls the
arsenal of non-tariﬀ measures that were put in place in the 1970s mainly against
Japan, but which had the eﬀect of blocking other developing country exports
into the US and the EU, the new protectionism. The 1980s saw increasing use of
36 WTO doc, ‘Background Document’, High Level Symposium on Trade and Development, Geneva,
17–18 March 1999.
37 R. Wilkinson, The WTO: Crisis and Governance of Global Trade (Routledge, 2006).
38 Ibid.
39 The increasing use of Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act which sanctioned unilateral action against
unfair trade practices by foreign trade partners. See S. Ostry, The Post-Cold War Trading System: Whose
on First? (London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
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trade remedy laws in the US and the EU and increasing resort to unilateral trade
measures by the US. By the time of the Uruguay Round, the US and the EU had
begun to establish a common agenda, vis-a`-vis the rest of the world. During the
Uruguay Round, the US and EU were able to ﬁnd accommodation of each
others interests in the Blair House Accord40 that was agreed between them on
20 November 1992. Even in the ﬁnal stages of the Uruguay Round negotiations,
during the ﬁrst week of December 2003, the EU and the US continued to negotiate
among themselves, in Brussels, prompting the then Director-General of the GATT,
Peter Sutherland, to urge the EU and the US to report to the other ‘over 100
participants ’ in Geneva ‘whose interests must also be assured and accom-
modated’.41 As the US and the EU continued to negotiate between themselves
almost until the day the Director-General called the end of the negotiations of
the Uruguay Round on 15 December 1993, many other members, especially the
developing countries, complained they were not in a position to assess the oﬀers
the EU and US were making against their own and that the agreements reached
between the EU and the US continued to reduce the ambition on many issues
of interest to developing countries, including agriculture, textiles, leather, cotton,
and tropical products.42
Another close observer of the Uruguay Round argued that the lack of real
market access gains for developing countries in developed countries agriculture
markets and the onerous commitments they made in the TRIPS agreement on
intellectual property led to the perception that developing countries ‘had given
more than they got’ and therefore the Uruguay Round Agreements were im-
balanced in favour of developed countries.43 Wilkinson has argued that this
imbalance has been endemic to the GATT system, and with each Ministerial
Conference of the WTO since the Doha Round was launched, this asymmetry
of economic opportunity in favour of the major developed countries has been
reinforced.44 Thus failed Ministerial Conferences are perceived to be a symptom of
this basic asymmetry of economic power that is embedded in the institutions of
the system.45 We now turn to an evaluation of the Doha Round negotiations up
to the period December 2008 and evaluate the validity of the above trends in the
GATT of US/EU protectionism and the dominance of their narrow mercantilist
interests.
40 See J. Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round (Second
and Revised Edition, The Hague, London, and Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999). Blair House was
the name of the US Presidents Guest House in Washington for foreign dignitaries.
41 Ibid., p. 321.
42 ibid., p. 325.
43 M. Finger, ‘Implementation and the Imbalance: Dealing with the Hangover from the Uruguay
Round’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 23(3) (2007): 440–460.
44 See R. Wilkinson, ‘The WTO in Hong Kong: What it Really Means for the Doha Development
Agenda’, Commentary, New Political Economy, 11(2) (June 2006).
45 R. Wilkinson, The WTO: Crisis and Governance of Global Trade (Routledge, 2006).
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An evaluation: the Doha Round up to December 2008
Since the launch of the Doha Round and the lead up to the Cancun Ministerial
Conference, WTO members missed the deadlines to agree on the modalities in
the agriculture and NAMA negotiations. This was mainly due to their failure to
meet the demands of the mandate to substantially reduce agricultural protection.
As the Cancun Ministerial Conference approached, the EU and US began to
negotiate a bilateral agreement to accommodate each others interests that was to
result in the EU–US joint text.
The EU–US joint text tabled on 13 August 2003 galvanized developing countries
into action to prevent another ‘Blair House’ type agreement that would accom-
modate the interests of the EU and the US and reduce the ambition of the Round
once again. In addition, the joint text agreed by the EU and the US on agriculture
took the negotiating process further back by agreeing to a mere ‘framework’ for
the agriculture negotiations just a few weeks prior to the Cancu´n Ministerial. The
EU–US joint text on agriculture was strongly challenged by a range of countries,
including Australia, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, and many other former US
allies who had coalesced around the common objective of securing freer global
agriculture markets. Developing countries, led by Brazil, China, India, South
Africa, and some others, established a broad-based alliance that grew into the
G20 group of developing countries coalition on agriculture.
In addition, a group of developing countries46 argued that the real danger of
a joint push by the EU and other developed countries (notably the US)47 to seek
additional extensive concessions from developing countries in the NAMA and
Services negotiations was that the development content of the Round would
be turned on its head, with the developed countries making more inroads into
developing country markets and with developing countries still facing high levels
of protection and distortions in global markets for products of export interest
to them. This united front was further consolidated in Hong Kong where Ministers
of the NAMA 11 group presented joint proposals in the negotiations on
NAMA.48 This group was able to also establish a strong link between the level of
ambition in NAMA with that in agriculture in the ﬁnal text of the Hong Kong
Declaration.49
The closing of ranks by the EU and the US was to become more visible again in
the Potsdam G4 (EU, US, Brazil, India) ministerial meeting (held on 19–21 June
46 See Statement by South Africa to the 55th session of the Committee on Trade and Development on
behalf of Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Namibia, the Philippines, and Venezuela, 28 November,
2005.
47Washington Trade Daily, DDA, ‘Do-able – USTR Schwab’, 17 July 2008.
48 See letter to the Chairman of the 6th Ministerial Conference, Hong Kong, 13 December 2005,
contained in ‘Twenty Months of the NAMA 11: Striving for Fair, Balanced and Development Friendly
Outcomes in the Doha Round’, South African Permanent Mission to the WTO (August 2007).
49 See WT/MIN (05)/DEC, para. 24 of the ‘Ministerial Declaration’, Doha Work Programme,
22 December 2005.
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2007), both to accommodate each others concerns, and to jointly apply pressure
on Brazil and India. Reﬂecting on the collapse of the negotiations after Potsdam,
the Foreign Trade Minister of Brazil, Celso Amorim, was to remark that the
collaboration of EU and US during the Potsdam meeting reminded him of the
EU–US Joint Text in the pre-Cancun period and he thus referred to the collabor-
ation of the EU and US in Potsdam as Cancun II.50
After Potsdam, the EU and US intensiﬁed the joint coordination of their
positions, on agriculture, NAMA, Services,51 and Environment.52 On agriculture,
the EU began to work more closely with the US bilaterally to build convergence
in their positions on speciﬁc issues. On NAMA, the EU and US presented two
new proposals on the 5 December 2007. The ﬁrst proposal53 called for a high level
of ambition for developing countries. The second proposal by the EU and US
called for the restriction of the existing ﬂexibilities that were already provided
for developing countries in paragraph 8 even further.54
The ﬁrst reason for the collapse of the Ministerial meetings stems from the lack
of political support in the EU and the US (and other developed countries) for
agricultural reform and the persistence of protectionism. To this must be added
their perceptions of the increased economic power of the emerging markets, which
gave rise to increased collusion between them to raise the level of ambition for
developing countries in NAMA and Services. Part of this was due to an increasing
clash of paradigms between the developed and developing countries, namely the
increased assertion of commercial interests (the reality) or the need for ‘new trade
ﬂows’ against the livelihoods of farmers in developing countries and the industrial
development prospects and jobs of workers in developing countries.
There are many factors that have contributed to this increasing protectionism
within the EU and the US, including the dwindling political fortunes of the lead-
ership in the major capitals (US, Japan, France, UK, Italy, Germany, and Canada)
and their fear of increased competition from the new emerging economies.
Messerlin55 explains this phenomenon as the result of ‘ increasingly thinner
governing majorities, creating diﬃculties for governments resisting vested
interests ’.
50Washington Trade Daily, 22 June 2007.
51 See WTO doc, ‘Report of the Chair’, Services Special Session, Job (08)/5, 12 February 2008. The
EC and the US developed a larger group that supported their views. This group consists of Australia,
Canada, EC, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu,
Kinmen and Matsu, Switzerland, and the USA.
52 See WTO doc, CTESS Job (07)/193, 3 December 2007.
53 WTO doc, communication by Canada, the European Communities, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand,
Norway, Switzerland, and the United States, titled ‘Joint Paper on Revised Draft Modalities for Non-
Agricultural Market Access’, 5 December 2007.
54 This proposal called for a prohibition of more than half of six digit subheadings to be excluded from
any four digit sub-heading that was subject to a full formula cut or any combination of six-digit sub-
headings (under a four digit) representing more than 50% of the total value of imports.
55 P. Messerlin, ‘How Much Further Can the WTO Go? Developed Countries Issues’, Trade Policy
Monitoring Centre (CEPR and Kiel Institute), mimeo, available at http://gem.sciences-po.fr.
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In the United States the failure of the US President to veto the 2008 US Farm Bill
and to re-new Trade Promotion Authority after its expiration on 1 July 2007,
and the rejection of the fast track procedures by the US Congress demanded by
President Bush, on the Columbia FTA, has been argued to have ‘destroyed the
credibility of the United States as a negotiating partner in the eyes of the rest of
the world’.56 The strong anti-trade rhetoric of the Presidential candidates also did
not help to restore conﬁdence in the ability of the US Administration to provide
leadership and deliver on its Doha obligations.57
An additional factor for the current tension in the Doha negotiations stems from
the perceived threat to the competitive positions of the traditional industrial
economies from the newly emerging economies, especially the rise of the so-called
BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). To these economies could be added
several more, including Mexico, South Africa, Argentina, and Malaysia. At the
UNCTAD XII conference, held in Accra, Ghana, the Secretary General of the UN,
Ban Ki Moon, stated that the developing country share of world exports have risen
from 30% to almost 40%. A recent report by Goldman Sachs58 stated that, since
2001, the US share of world gross domestic product has fallen from 34% to 28%,
whilst the BRICs countries share has risen from 8% to 16%. In this same period,
China’s reserves have rocketed from 200 billion dollars to 1,800 billion dollars,
Brazils from 35 billion to 200 billion dollars, and India’s from 50 billion to
300 billion dollars’.
In a rare display of public frustration with the US negotiating position, after
the collapse of the July G7 ministerial meetings, Mandelson, the then EU
Commissioner, stated in his weblog, ‘when the negotiations resumed during
the day before the ﬁnal collapse, and Pascal Lamy presented a new compromise
proposal on the SSM, the Indians and Chinese express reservations and the US
rejects the proposals outright, much to Lamys understandable frustration’.
He went on to criticize the US approach in the negotiations as follows: ‘ the dollar-
for-dollar approach does not add up in any way_ in a development round a
dollar-for-dollar approach is never going to add up’.59 The USTR was clearly un-
der pressure from the US business lobbies that were to reject the compromise on
sectorals that was ﬁnally agreed by the G7 ministers and recorded as such by the
Chair of the NAMA negotiations in his report on the July ministerial meetings.
The National Association of Manufactures of the US (NAM) criticized the report
of the NAMA chair for weakening the level of ambition on sectorals and urged
the USTR to refuse to accept the report as a basis for negotiations. The NAM
stated that ‘given the weakness of the present across the board industrial tariﬀ
cutting proposal balance is only possible if the key countries of Brazil, China and
56 C. F. Bergsten, ‘World Trade at Risk’, Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 2008.
57 Financial Times, ‘Obama Aims to Calm Fears over Free Trade’, 27 June 2008.
58 Golman Sachs, Brics and Beyond (Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group, 2007).
59 Reuters, EU’s Mandelson points at US after WTO collapse.
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India were to participate in negotiating sectoral agreements that would eliminate
duties in major industrial sectors ’.60
Again, in the period July 2008 to December 2008, the USTR Susan Schwab did
not seem to have much room to maneuver. Even as Pascal Lamy was working for
a ministerial meeting to resolve the outstanding issues in the negotiations, the
US Congress was working against this initiative. On 2 December, the chairs of
two Congressional Committees, from both the House and the Senate wrote a letter
to President Bush, which stated that : ‘ In July of this year we commended your
administration for walking away from a lopsided WTO package that we in
Congress would not have been able to support_We strongly urge you not to
allow the calendar to drive the negotiations through eﬀorts to hastily schedule a
ministerial meeting.’61 US lawmakers from both sides of the aisle applauded
the cancellation of the proposed ministerial meeting by Pascal Lamy and stated
that they will work with the incoming Obama Administration in the New Year to
seek solutions to the many ‘issues that have so far remained elusive’.62
The discussion above thus points to the continuity of increased protectionism
by both the US and the EU that has been re-invigorated in the current Doha Round
by the perceptions of the increasing competitiveness of the newly emerging
developing countries. The attempts by the US and the EU to co-ordinate their
positions, accommodating their own interests and then seeking aggressive gains
from other economies, especially the emerging markets, have been a strong feature
of the Doha Round negotiations since Cancun and must be regarded as a major
contributing factor to the collapse of the WTO July 2008 ministerial meetings and
the failure of the December 2008 meetings to conclude the modalities negotiations.
It is not just the increased co-ordination of the EU and the US per se that is a
cause of concern for developing countries but their considerable joint economic
power and leverage, which is often used to foist their own interests and positions
on the rest of the membership, especially the developing countries. Developing
country alliances in the Doha Round have emerged as a counterbalance to this
overwhelming negotiating leverage that the EU and US bring to bear on the system
when they co-ordinate their eﬀorts.
Thus Wilkinson’s observations (discussed above) of the persistence of asym-
metry of economic opportunity in the GATT/WTO since the early GATT rounds
continues to retain its validity up to the end of July 2008 ministerial meetings and
the failure of the WTO in December 2008. We now turn to the third reason for
the collapse of the July 2008 ministerial meetings. The historical debate on the
60Washington Trade Daily, 15/18 August 2008.
61 Letter addressed to President Bush from the Congress of the United States, signed by Charles
Rangel, Chairman, Committee onWays and Means; Max Baucus, Chairman, Committee on Finance; Jim
McCrery, Ranking Member, Committee on Ways and Means; Charles Grassley, Ranking Member
Committee on Finance.
62Washington Trade Daily, 15 December 2008.
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methods of decision making in the GATT will be brieﬂy assessed and the principal
supplier principle method of negotiations employed in the GATT will be evalu-
ated. We will then evaluate the method of negotiations employed in the July 2008
ministerial meetings in this historical context.
(2) The principal supplier principle
The debate in a historical perspective
A recent evaluation of the state of the WTO undertaken by the Warwick
Commission63 called for greater ﬂexibility in the voting system. The Commission
called for the concept of ‘variable geometry’ to replace the more rigid ‘single
undertaking’ concept that was deployed in the Uruguay Round, and that has since
become the conventional approach in the Doha Round. TheWarwick Commission
points to the earlier practices in the Tokyo Round where various agreements were
reached on the codes on standards, import licensing, anti-dumping, subsidies and
countervailing measures and customs valuation’. The Commission urges WTO
members to seriously consider ‘critical mass as part of the decision-making
procedures for delineating the WTO agenda’.
However, an earlier report,64 established by the previous Director-General of the
WTO, Dr Supachai Panitchpakdi, supports the consensus approach to decision
making that is generally followed by the WTO, and suggests ways in which this
could be improved. The Sutherland Report recommended that in an attempt
to reduce the resort to blocking measures (such as a veto by a single country to
prevent consensus) by some countries, there should be a responsibility by the
country seeking to block a decision to declare in writing that the matter is one of
vital national interest to it. This recommendation if implemented could help the
WTO to strengthen the consensus approach to decision making and help the critics
who have felt frustrated by the eﬀorts of large members to block consensus, where
the underlying reasons are extraneous to trade issues.
The Sutherland Report also addressed the call by some members to develop a
diﬀerentiated (plurilateral) approach to those issues on which only a subset of
members are able and willing to deepen liberalization and rule-making. The
Report took a cautious approach to this possibility, suggesting further deliber-
ation. It was judicious in taking this approach, as WTO members are currently
divided on this issue and many are suspicious that this would create a two-speed
and two-track system, compromising the principle of inclusiveness. The previous
Director-General was concerned about the serious criticisms that the WTO faced
as a result of the perception amongst civil society and developing country groups
63 The Warwick Commission, The Multilateral Trading Regime: Which Way Forward? (The
University of Warwick, December 2007).
64 The Future of theWTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the NewMillennium, Report by the
Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi (WTO, 2004).
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about its lack of transparency and inclusiveness in its decision making and
imbalanced outcomes.65
The issue of voting method is an old debate in the GATT and has it origins in the
early negotiations on the proposed International Trade Organization (ITO) that
was to be part of the Bretton Woods institutions after the War. During the nego-
tiations on the proposed ITO after the Second World War, the issue of the voting
method was one of the few issues on which the developing countries were more
successful. For decision making in the ITO, the US delegation proposed the same
method of weighted voting that was used in the recently created International
Monetary Fund (IMF). A similar proposal was made by the UK, to take into
account the economic size of the country in its share of the vote – a system of
weighted voting. Developing countries voiced their opposition to such a system
of voting as they feared that this would institutionalize their secondary status.
A number of developing countries,66 voiced strong opposition to weighted voting
and came out in favour of consensus. As a consequence, the ITO did not adopt a
system of weighted voting. This decision was to be adopted by the GATT that
adopted the consensus approach to its decision making.
The principal supplier approach also had its origins in the early ITO/GATT
debates. During the negotiations on the ITO, many members had preferred a
system of bargaining that was formula based – across the board tariﬀ nego-
tiations – but the US Congress indicated that this would be unacceptable to them.
The UK supported this method, as it would have led to the levelling of high US
tariﬀs. The US delegation however argued for a system of reciprocal bargaining
over speciﬁc tariﬀ lines that required a product-by-product, principal supplier
method of tariﬀ negotiations by which a country could only be requested to make
tariﬀ cuts on a particular product by the principal supplier of that product to
that country.67 This meant that for any particular product the importing country
negotiates its tariﬀ rate with its principal supplier and not with all suppliers of
the same product. Developing countries at the time were seldom principal sup-
pliers of any product, except raw materials that entered industrialized countries
duty free. Only at the 4th Geneva Round of GATT in 1956 was this rule modiﬁed
to allow developing countries to negotiate collectively in requesting concessions.
However, they were still eﬀectively prevented from requesting concessions in any
products that they did not produce in large quantities. Thus, the principal supplier
rule had the eﬀect of locking out developing countries from the tariﬀ cutting
negotiations.
The current debate in the WTO on the formation of small informal groups
that become the main decision making forums or that shape the main content of
65 See F. Jawara, and A. Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International Trade
Negotiations (Zed Books, 2003).
66 Such as Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, El Salvador, Venezuela, and Mexico.
67 R. Wilkinson and J. Scott, ‘Developing Country Participation in the GATT: A Re-assessment’,
World Trade Review, 3 (July 2008): 1–18.
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the deals has signiﬁcant resonance in the debate in the GATT since its inception.
The negotiating method employed in July 2008 harked back to the principal sup-
plier approach utilized in the old GATT. We discuss this further in the section
below.
An evaluation: the G7 in the July 2008 ministerial meetings
The third reason for the collapse of the Ministerial meetings is ironically due to
the ‘medieval process ’68 that saw the EU/US sticking to old habits of setting up
imbalanced small groups that cut the main deals, without consideration for the
smaller players, and the marginalization of their issues in the negotiations. The G7
was a surprise after the failure of the G4 (and earlier G5 and G6 informal minis-
terial groups) in Potsdam. The package that emerged on Friday night, 25 July 2008
(see discussion above) was not agreed and did not address the issues of interest
to the majority of members. It was not supported by India and China and gained
no legitimacy amongst the majority of members.
The African Ministers who were not represented in the Group of 7, also
expressed their concerns in a statement made in July by stating that, ‘we are deeply
concerned that in the Group of Seven (G7) not one African country was
represented in a round that purports to be about development’ and that ‘most
of the issues of importance to the African continent were not even discussed,
especially cotton’.69 Reﬂecting their dissatisfaction with the G7 process, the G33
group of developing countries, whilst they continued to support the positions
that India and China expressed (India and China were represented in the G7) on
the SSM, called for the issue of SSM to be returned to the WTO agriculture
Negotiating Group, chaired by Crawford Falconer as soon as possible.70
Thus, the G7 ministerial meetings called by Pascal Lamy during the July 2008
ministerial meetings failed to achieve the objective of negotiating the breakthrough
in the agriculture and NAMA modalities negotiations that the Director-General,
Pascal Lamy, had hoped for. Some agreements reached in the G7 on elements of
the modalities – the so-called ‘Lamy Package’ – did not have the support of all
the members of the G7.71 In addition, the ‘Lamy Package’ did not enjoy the sup-
port of the majority of members that felt that their issues were marginalized in
the negotiations. In addition, the Director-General, Pascal Lamy, did not succeed
in resolving any of the issues of interest to the smaller developing countries in
smaller side meetings that were on his so-called ‘to do’ list !72 Cotton did not get
68 Pascal Lamy, after the collapse of the WTO CancunMinisterial meeting in 2003 blamed this on the
‘medieval process’ of the negotiations.
69 Press Statement issued by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade of Kenya, 30 July
2008.
70 SeeWashington Trade Daily, 15 September, 2008.
71 See letters by Kamal Nath, Minister of Commerce of India, to the WTO Director-General, Pascal
Lamy, dated 24 September 2008 and 17 October 2008.
72 Pascal Lamy’s ‘ to do list’ included the issues that were not in the Lamy Package, and included the
issue of cotton, bananas, DFQFMA, preference erosion, etc.
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onto the agenda at all. The banana negotiations unraveled. The issue of duty free
quota free market access (DFQFMA) for LDCs was not addressed. There were
several more diﬃcult issues on NAMA that included South Africa, Argentina, and
Venezuela that also remained unresolved.
We now turn to the third reason for the failure of the July and December 2008
attempts to conclude the modalities negotiations: the persistence of imbalanced
texts against the interests of developing countries. The next section will begin by
discussing the theory and role of the chair in WTO negotiations and proceed
to consider the role of the NAMA chair in contributing to the imbalanced texts
in the negotiations on modalities in July and December 2008.
(3) Imbalanced texts and the role of the chairs: theory and practice
Theory on the role of the chair
In a recent comprehensive study of the role of the chair in international nego-
tiations, Jonas Tallberg73 attempts to develop a ‘rational institutionalist theory’ of
the role of the chair in international negotiations and describes this role as ‘formal
leadership’. In his consideration of these three roles of the chair in WTO nego-
tiations he argues that the role of representation is seldom required. Thus, the role
of the chair in the WTO negotiations is adequately described as that of agenda
management and brokerage. He argues that the chairs that play these roles are
vested with ‘asymmetric ’ power to inﬂuence the negotiations. This power comes
from their privileged access to information about the real preferences of members
and the support of the secretariat, and their control over the negotiating process.
However, this asymmetric power is conditioned by the rules governing decision
making and the design of the chairmanship. He argues that the chairs’ scope to
inﬂuence the negotiations is much wider, if the method of decision making is
that of majority voting, than the tougher methods of consensus or unanimity,
where the interests of all parties have to be considered.
After applying his theory to the three diﬀerent institutional settings of the EU,
the WTO, and the multilateral environmental agreements, Tallberg argues that
in both the latter cases, formal leaders positively enhanced the eﬃciency of the
negotiations by transforming competing proposals into single texts and forging
agreements. In addition, in these cases he argues that there was ‘no evidence of the
chairs having systematically biased outcomes’.74 However, the extensive research
undertaken by Odell75 of decision making in the GATT/WTO provides several
examples of sub-optimal or ineﬃcient outcomes as a result of injudicious use of
the brokerage methods or the bias of the chair.
73 J. Tallberg, ‘The Power of the Chair: Formal Leadership in International Cooperation’,
International Studies Quarterly (forthcoming).
74 Ibid.
75 J. Odell, ‘Chairing a WTO Negotiation’, Journal of International Economic Law, 8(2): 425–448.
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In a study76 undertaken of the role of the NAMA chair, in the NAMA nego-
tiations, between the Potsdam G4 ministerial meeting in June 2007, and the July
2008 ministerial meeting I have argued that his role reﬂected all the above errors.
His failure to provide eﬃcient formal leadership was contrasted with that of
the chair of agriculture, in the agriculture negotiations who displayed a capacity
to listen carefully to the views of diﬀerent members, to act in an objective manner,
to make judicious use of the tools of brokerage (providing alternative options,
single texts etc) and the appropriate timing of single texts, and a ﬁerce indepen-
dence from the inﬂuence of any of the major developed or developing country
groups in the WTO.
The remainder of this paper argues that the events of July 2008 support the
evidence provided by Odell that there is signiﬁcant evidence of ineﬃcient outcomes
in the GATT/WTO negotiations as a result of the failure of the chairs to listen
carefully to members, their inability to act in an objective manner due to their
loyalty to national interests, their poor judgement of the use and timing of the tools
available to them to build consensus (two or three options, single draft text),
and their incorrect weighting of the views of the diﬀerent groups of members
(EU, US, developing country groups).
An evaluation of the role of the chairs in the July 2008 meetings
The NAMA 11 group of developing countries that represented a signiﬁcant group
of emerging market economies criticized the various draft texts of the NAMA
chair that emerged in the period before the July 2008 ministerial meeting for
ignoring their views and reﬂecting the preferences of the chair. This position
was enunciated as follows by the South African Statement to the TNC on 22 July:
‘Our experience in the NAMA negotiations over the last two years is that the texts
that have emerged at various points have consistently ignored the positions and
views we have expressed as the NAMA 11.’ Furthermore, the statement notes
that whilst the ‘the agricultural negotiations have been conducted through a
carefully constructed ‘‘bottom-up’’ process through which the positions of
all WTO Members are found in the agricultural modalities text, the NAMA
modalities text is highly circumscribed and prescriptive. The text sets out a narrow
range of coeﬃcients, and oﬀers ﬂexibilities that have a double constraint in terms
of the percentage of tariﬀ lines and trade volumes that can be covered.’ The
statement goes on to state that ‘we have witnessed a range of demands that would
result in an outcome where many developing countries that are required to reduce
their tariﬀs are being required to accept reduction commitments that are deep and
in excess of the cuts to be borne by developed countries. These demands are
inconsistent with the Doha development mandate and cannot be a basis for
concluding the Round. ’77
76 F. Ismail, ‘The Role of the Chair in the WTO Negotiations: From the Potsdam Collapse in June
2007 to July 2008’, unpublished paper.
77 WTO doc, ‘South African Statement to the WTO TNC’, 22 July 2008.
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In a statement made to the TNC on the 26 July, Argentina stated that without
signiﬁcant changes to the ‘Lamy Package’ it would be very diﬃcult for Argentina
to support it. Argentina argued that the package was ‘poor in agriculture and
substantially unbalanced in NAMA’. Argentina argued that the implications of
the proposed formula in NAMA would mean less than full reciprocity in reverse
for developing countries, as the formula required developing counties to make a
deeper cut in their tariﬀs than developed countries.78
Minister Amorim, the Foreign Trade Minister of Brazil, also criticized the im-
balanced texts, between agriculture and NAMA and within NAMA. Summing
up Brazil’s views on the agriculture text, he argued79 that the text was ‘built on a
logic of accommodating exceptions rather than seeking ambition, with almost
30 paragraphs in the text establishing speciﬁc carve-outs for speciﬁc countries ’.
In contrast, he argued ‘the NAMA text was built on the logic of forcing countries,
especially developing ones, out of comfort zones’ and he referred to the attempts
to extract an ‘additional price’ in the NAMA negotiations from developing
countries through the anti-concentration clause and ‘disguisedmandatory sectorals
which would overload the negotiations and make a conclusion impossible ’.80
Thus, the statements above point to signiﬁcant dissatisfaction81 amongst some
major developing countries and developing country groups on the lack of balance
between the agriculture and NAMA texts and in particular the ‘additional price ’
or increased level of ambition that developing countries in NAMA were being
asked to pay in the negotiations, than the relatively lower level of obligations that
developed countries were willing to commit to in the agriculture negotiations.
In NAMA, the chair was believed to have taken sides with the developed country
demandeurs by setting the level of ambition in NAMA even before the level
of ambition in agriculture had been agreed (discussed above) and by adding the
anti-concentration clause and ‘disguised mandatory sectorals ’, when the Doha
mandate called for sectorals to be voluntary.
The ‘Lamy Package’ was seen by many developing countries to be attempting
to reinforce the basic imbalances contained in the agriculture and NAMA texts
as the Argentinian statement suggests. In a memorandum82 written to Trade
Ministers earlier in July, Pascal Lamy, the Director-General of the WTO and
the chair of Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC), attempted to equate the
78 See WTO doc, ‘Statement of Argentina to the TNC’, 26 July 2008.
79 See WTO doc, ‘Statement by Minister Celso Amorim to the Informal TNC’, 21 July 2008,
As delivered.
80 See also ‘G20 Statement on the State of Play’, 20 June 2008 and ‘G20 Statement to the WTO
Committee on Agriculture – Special Session’, Open-Ended Informal Meeting, 26 May 2008, in G20, Five
Years of Activities of the G20: Moving Forward the Doha Round, July 2008, Brazilian PermanentMission
to the UN and WTO.
81 South Africa represents the NAMA 11 in theWTO and Brazil is the co-ordinator of the G20.Whilst
the Ministers made the above statements in their own country names, their views largely reﬂect the views
of the NAMA 11 and the G20 respectively.
82 P. Lamy, ‘The Moment of Truth’, International Herald Tribune, 3 July 2008.
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contributions that were being asked of developed countries in agriculture with
that of developing countries in NAMA. Referring to the commitments of devel-
oped countries to cut their farm subsidies by 70% (this is misleading as the much
lower actual spending of developed countries than their bound rates will mean
insigniﬁcant or no real cuts in subsidies) and farm tariﬀ cuts of about 50% (this
is also misleading as a signiﬁcant part of developed country tariﬀs will be allowed
to remain prohibitive due to the many exceptions and ﬂexibilities that have been
provided in the agriculture text), he then urges developing countries to make a
contribution by opening their markets ‘ in exchange for greater market oppor-
tunities’ that will be provided to them by the developed countries. This view
should be contrasted with the views of a large body of developing countries that
believed that the balance between the two texts was against developing countries.
The events that led to the failure of the attempt to conclude the modalities
negotiations in December 2008 (described above) were to underline the persistence
of the imbalanced texts and the undue pressures exerted by the US (the EU, Japan,
and Canada continued to support the US demand for a high level of ambition in
sectorals) to maintain a high level of ambition in areas of interest to the developed
countries, whilst reducing the ambition in areas of interest to developing countries.
At the TNC meeting held on the 17 December 2008, the G20 group of developing
countries stated that ‘since July 2008 the gap between agriculture and NAMA
has increased’.83 The G20 statement went on to state that: ‘We observe with
great concern the continuous reduction of the level of ambition in agriculture,
particularly on Market Access and Domestic Support. Layers of exceptions are
added for developed countries – in preserving high levels of ‘water’ in domestic
support entitlements ; in failing to move ahead on cotton, a central issue for a truly
Development Agenda; in increasing the number of sensitive products ; in avoiding
tariﬀ capping and full and fair tariﬀ simpliﬁcation; and in creating new TRQs.’
The NAMA 1184 Group of developing countries have opposed the demand by the
US and other developed countries to make sectorals, especially in sectors of interest
mainly to the developed countries, mandatory. The NAMA 11 argued that the
demand to make sectorals mandatory is not consistent with the mandate that
requires developing countries to enter into such sectoral negotiations on a volun-
tary basis. Conceding to the demands of the US/EU would have deepened the
‘asymmetry of economic opportunity’ that has characterized GATT/WTO agree-
ments thus far.85
The discussion above suggests that the perception amongst a large number of
developing countries was that the texts were imbalanced against the interests
83 WTO doc, ‘G20 TNC Statement’, 17 December 2008.
84 See WTO doc, ‘Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products: Sectoral Negotiations’,
Communication from the NAMA 11 Group of Developing Countries, TN/MA/W/108/Rev.1,
12 November 2008.
85 See R. Wilkinson, ‘The WTO in Hong Kong: What it Really Means for the Doha Development
Agenda’, Commentary, New Political Economy, 11(2) (June 2006).
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of developing countries and that the chairs of NAMA and the TNC suﬀered from
some errors of judgement that would bias the outcomes in favour of the developed
countries. In the conclusion below, we will summarize the three reasons advanced
in this paper for the collapse of the July 2008 ministerial meetings and then make
some policy recommendations for WTO members.
4. Conclusion: policy recommendations
The paper has argued that one of the important reasons for the failure of the end
July Ministerial meetings has been the persistence of protectionism within the EU
and the US. As the negotiating process continued both the EU and US, working
closely together, increased the pressure on developing countries, particularly the
major emerging markets, to open their markets, in agriculture, NAMA, and
Services, whilst ensuring that they accommodated their particular sensitivities. The
second reason for the failure of the end of July ministerial meetings was argued to
be the return to a small group approach (the G7) reﬂecting the power politics, and
‘principle supplier’ approach of the past. The G7 Ministers failed to agree to
the ‘Lamy Package’, and Pascal Lamy declared at the TNC on the 29 July that
the G7 Ministers had failed to reach agreement on modalities on agriculture and
NAMA. Pascal Lamy stated that he was not ‘throwing in the towel’. He called for
the progress made during the course of the Ministerial Meetings to be ‘preserved’
and for the membership to begin a process of reﬂection.86 The third reason for
the failure that the paper oﬀers is the imbalanced draft texts, particularly between
agriculture and NAMA, with the NAMA text failing to reﬂect adequately the
views of the members. This is partly ascribed to the role of the chair of the nego-
tiating group who by his own admission decided at the very outset, in his ﬁrst
draft text, to determine the level of ambition himself.
We make three recommendations to address the underlying causes of the
collapse of the July 2008 ministerial meetings.
Firstly, the success of the next attempt to advance the Doha negotiations will
also require that the EU and US take account of the development interests of the
large and smaller developing countries and not simply try to advance their own
commercial interests. Fairness and balance in the negotiations will require that the
large number of exemptions the developed countries have demanded to accom-
modate their agriculture sensitivities are reciprocated in providing similar ﬂexi-
bilities to developing countries to protect their poor farmers and industrial
workers.
Secondly, the WTO would need to think carefully about how it constitutes
small groups in the future to advance the negotiations. China, India, the US, and
the EU can claim to be part of any small group that is created to broker a deal
because of their size but the interests of the rest of the membership have to be
86 See WTO doc, TNC, ‘Statement by the Chairman’, Job (08)/94, 30 July 2008.
An assessment of the WTO Doha Round July–December 2008 collapse 603
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745609990073
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:40:58, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
represented in any negotiating group. The model of small groups which includes
members simply on the basis of their economic and political weight or ‘principal
supplier approach’ is not suited to the diversity of economic interests and the
political expectations of members to be represented and included at every stage of
the negotiating process.
The WTO since the onset of the Doha Round, and particularly after Cancun,
has evolved a rich tapestry of alliances or groups, especially amongst the majority
of developing countries. These groups can play a constitute role in building
joint negotiating positions and convergence among the membership. Pascal Lamy,
the then Commissioner of the EU, had acknowledged the positive role of
developing country groups in the WTO; after Cancun, when he compared the G20
to a Trade Union legitimately representing its members, and subsequently in
Hong Kong, where the deal was brokered in the ‘Green Room’ that included
representatives of the diﬀerent groups, including the G33, the ACP, Africa Group,
and the LDCs. Thus, it is only fair that the ACP, Africa Group, the G33,
the NAMA 11, the Cotton 4 and the LDCs are also represented in any future
negotiating group.
Thirdly, both Tallberg’s and Odell’s studies (discussed above) of the role of
the chairs suggest that formal leaders can positively enhance the eﬃciency of the
negotiations by transforming competing proposals into single texts and forging
agreements. This positive and eﬃcient role of the chairs in WTO negotiations can
be restored in the WTO by studying the more successful eﬀorts of previous chairs
that have enjoyed wide support amongst the membership, such as that of the chair
of the agriculture negotiations, in the period before and including the WTO July
2008 ministerial meetings. In addition, the WTO could develop a code of conduct
for the chairs of the negotiating groups, based on its own rich experience of the
performance of previous WTO chairs.
Developing Countries should continue to strive to conclude the Doha Round on
its development mandate. Developing countries must again pickup the pieces of
the failed ministerial meetings at the end of July 2008 and the failure again at the
end of December, as they have done at each stage of the Round, after the collapse
in Cancun, then again after the suspension of the Round in July 2006, and once
more after the G4 Potsdam collapse in June 2007. They must reﬂect and learn from
their experiences. They must rebuild their technical and organizational capacity
and strengthen their alliances. And they must march on to the next phase of the
struggle to achieve a fair, balanced, inclusive, and development oriented outcome
in the Doha Development Round. They should not rest until the promises of
development in the Doha mandate have been fulﬁlled.
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APPENDIX 1
Seattle 3rd WTO Ministerial Conference fails to
launch Doha
– December 1999
Doha 4th WTO Ministerial Conference succeeds:
launches the DDA
– November 2001
. Deadlines for Modalities in agriculture – end March 2003
. Deadlines for Modalities in NAMA – end May 2003
Cancun 5th WTO Ministerial Conference collapses – September 2003
WTO July 2004 General Council succeeds:
‘Framework Agreement’
– July 2004
Hong Kong WTO 6th Ministerial Conference:
incremental progress
– December 2005
Failure of G6 ministerials results in Suspension – July 2006
Failure of G4 ministerial at Potsdam – June 2007
Failure of the G7 ministerial in Geneva – July 2008
Cancellation of proposed ministerial – December 2008
An assessment of the WTO Doha Round July–December 2008 collapse 605
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745609990073
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:40:58, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
